The paper adds to the literature on propaganda wars. This area attracts practitioners as well as researchers from a variety of fields such as philosophy, social and political science, psychology. It also attracts IT researchers and mathematicians who develop and study models of propaganda wars. In this paper we apply the mathematical model of making choices by individuals to the problem of how the extent of social polarization affects the outcome of the propaganda battle. By the term "propaganda battle" we mean that each member of the society is subject to two competing flows of information. These two flows are generated by two competing parties and each flow consists of propaganda and rumor. That is each party runs propaganda via its own mass-media, and the rumor adds to propaganda as individuals get information from media and transmit it further through interpersonal communications with other individuals. The kind of society is considered which comprises two groups with diametrically opposite fundamental attitudes. The mathematical model has been investigated analytically and numerically. It is shown that moderate political polarization favors the side that runs more intensive propaganda. However, the advantage of stronger propaganda is impaired if the polarization is great enough, because neither media nor individuals can reassure their radical opponents.
Introduction
The set of issues related to propaganda wars and more broadly, to purposeful spread of information, attracts practitioners as well as researchers from a variety of fields such as philosophy, social and political science, psychology [1, 2] . It also attracts IT researchers and mathematicians who develop and study models of propaganda wars.
There is a long history of studying single rumor models [3, 4] . In the most general terms, these models assume that we have a closed group of individuals, and at every point in time some of them have a certain piece of information and transmit it to other individuals. Thus, there is a spread of rumor. Today there is an extensive literature on this subject which has been developed mainly as a branch of mathematics, in some separation from social science. A lot of papers develop the approach of [3] . For example, the model with latent, constant recruitment, and varying total population was studied in [5] , and the model with several groups of spreaders was considered in [6] . This latter model
Here   Xt is the number of spreaders at time t. The parameters ,
 are linked to the intensity of mass-media and intensity of propagation of information through interpersonal communications, respectively. This basic model (1) is being developed in several directions. The optimal control problem was introduced and studied in [14, 15] ; and three factors of spread of information were implemented in the model in [16] . Those factors are incomplete coverage of society by the partisan media, two-step perception of information by individuals, forgetting of information by individuals. The model of propaganda war [17, 18] based on model (1) implies that there are two sources of information. They are antagonistic in the sense that no person can be a spreader of both rumors. The three above-mentioned factors of spread of information were implemented in the model of propaganda war in [19, 20] .
It should be noted that the theoretical model is not very closely connected with empirical data. The main reason is probably the fact that sociological studies provide real data about the awareness of individuals regarding certain information for only a few moments of time, which is insufficient for proper quantification of the model. However, there is some empirical evidence for the qualitative justification of the models. So, in work [21] devoted to the study of the influence of the media on the genocide in Rwanda in ethnic clashes in 1994, it was shown that the most intense ethnic cleansing happened in the villages who took over the radio station RTLM that promote violence, and in the neighboring ones. Hence, it was concluded that there are two mechanisms for the transmission of information: through radio and interpersonal communication and through the residents of nearby villages.
Finally, we note that models of type (1) (or more complex, but developing the same approaches) are used not only to study the spread of information itself, but also, for example, when modeling the mass distribution of innovative products [22] [23] [24] . № 1 / 2017 67 In this paper, we develop an approach that is focused on a different aspect of information warfarethat is, choosing the positions of the individuals in the confrontation. It is based on the proposed in [25] model built on Rashevsky's neurological scheme [26, 27] .
This model is applied to the study of the question of how the level of political polarization affects the outcome of the propaganda battle. This question is increasingly relevant firstly due to the development of social media. In recent sociological literature the issue of increasing polarization due to the development of social media and the Internet in general (see, e.g., [28, 29] ), and the impact of polarization on political events [30] is widely discussed.
The detailed discussion of mathematical formalization of the concept of "a polarized society", is in [31] , the main idea in a simple graphic form is presented in [32] .
In the present work, polarized society is described using a distribution curve with two high horizontal plateaus. The distance between the gravity centers of these plateaus is taken as a measure of polarization. Thus, the process of increasing polarization has the form of a mutual removal of the plateau from each other.
Further ideas are structured in the following way. Section 2 is devoted to the description of the model, sections 3 and 4 deal respectively with the cases of constant and slowly increasing polarization. Finally, section 5 discusses the sociological meaning of the results.
Model
Selection model of the individuals in the propaganda struggle in society [25] assumes that society is a struggle between two parties X and Y, each of which has its own media.
An individual belonging to this society, at each moment of time has a certain underlying position on the issue in question. This underlying position consists of a permanent attitude and the dynamic term. Attitude
 
,     is a fundamental tendency to support one party or another: it is formed during previous social experience of an individual and takes into consideration social situation and it is assumed to be unchanged for this confrontation. Dynamic component     , t     has a meaning determined by social environment of the shift of stimuli towards the support of the party X. It is affected by the propaganda of both parties through the media and rumors, i.e., information shared by other members of the society through interpersonal communication.
The attitude  is individual for each member of the society, as a dynamic component   t  describes the information field of society as a whole. (In this case, more complex models can take into account that, for example, conservatives read conservative newspapers more, and the liberalsthe liberal newspapers. Model [16] takes into account that some companies do not use media, and receives information only in interpersonal communications). 
The total number of individuals is given by
The model is based on Rashevsky neurological scheme [26, 27] , which describes the formation of the reaction of an individual in response to incoming stimuli taking into account his attitude. With regard to the subject of propaganda warfare between the two parties, the reaction is the manifest position of the individual, i.e. his participation in the spread of information in support of one of the parties. The stimulus is the information that he receives (both through interpersonal communication and mass media).
Very roughly, the formation reaction can be described as follows. Suppose someday the individual received information from three supporters of party X and a supporter of party Y, read one newspaper article in favor of party X and two in favor of the party Y. Having weighed these stimuli in a certain way, we get a change of his position in favor of a particular party (the weighting factors are set in this model exogenously). For example, taking into account his attitude, he could become more or less radical supporter of his own party or switch to the other side.
The model has the form (see [25] for details):
with the initial condition
Here   0 X is given number of supporters of the party in the initial moment of time, the
b  characterize the intensity of the media propaganda of the parties, for clearness, in this work it is assumed that 12 bb  . The positive constants , , , a A C  are introduced in the neurological model [26, 27] , which provides neurological sense for these parameters. We can also propose some sociological interpretation. Thus, the parameter a describes the decay rate of the dynamic term of the internal position of an individual. For example, in the hypothetical disappearance of all social stimuli, equation
Thus, the internal position of each individual is striving to the position without propaganda warfare. The parameter a is the rate of this "relaxation". The constant C characterizes the importance of interpersonal communication compared to propaganda. For example, if individuals experience a strong distrust to media reports, but susceptible to the rumors, then 1 C  . Finally, the expression A describes the general susceptibility of individuals to stimuli (in other words, characterizes the significance of the factors of confrontation in comparison with the attitude  ).
After finding the function   t  as the solutions of problem (2), it is easy to find the number of supporters     , X t Y t for each of the parties. If for sufficiently large there is the inequality
 then we say that party X wins. If at the same time
, the victory is called total. Similarly we introduce the concepts of victory and total victory of the party Y.
In the present work, the model (3), (4) is applied to the study of propaganda warfare in a polarized society. Thus, we study the situation in which the society consists of two groups, each of which has a tendency to support "their" source of information. More specifically, such distribution is considered (see Fig. 1 )
Here 0 dh . The parameter d characterizes the degree of polarization of society that is how groups are distant from each other in attitudes. The parameter 1/h is a measure of consolidation of individuals within each group.
To find the stationary solution to equation (3)  .
We introduce the notation
. It is easy to show that the mutual configuration of the line a and the broken   f  depends on the balance between the four numbers: ,, Q P h and d .
In this work we restrict ourselves to a detailed analysis of the situation 
The research strategy is to consider the various resulting cases in order of increasing polarization of society d , and on the basis of this analysis to make meaningful conclusions about the system.
Depending on the values of d, equation (3) has from 1 to 5 positions of equilibrium, for which we introduce the following notation:
The equilibrium position 1  corresponds to a stationary number of supporters of political parties, equal to
This means a total victory of party X. Similarly for the other equilibria we have (Fig. 8) , which is achieved for any initial condition. Thus, we've considered all the cases arising in the implementation of inequality (6) . Sociological conclusions from this analysis are discussed in section 5.
The slow polarization of society process
In the previous section it was assumed that the polarization is constant. Now let's consider the case when it increases linearly over time. Such processes are connected with fundamental changes in the structure of society, so they are quite slow (compared to processes of information confrontation on specific issues). In this regard, let's assume the rate of increase in polarization as small:
№ 1 / 2017 73 where 1   . Numerical experiments show that the solutions of problem (3), (4) have an inner transition layer (Fig.18 ). Such decisions are called contrast structures (see, for example, [33] [34] [35] ). The purpose of this section is the construction of asymptotics for solutions of this type. At the same time, we continue to assume that condition is fulfilled (6) . 
Regarding the initial conditions let's assume for definiteness that there is the most meaningful case in which the society passes all of the states discussed in section 3, and the solution to the problem (8), (9) has the maximum possible number of transition layers. That is, let's assume
In accordance with the method of boundary functions [34] the asymptotic of solutions to problem (8)-(10) has the form
Here 0  is the point of localization of the contrast structure (the corresponding value 00 / t   is indicated in Fig.9 Let's restrict ourselves to the construction of asymptotics of the zero order, and then compare the obtained result with the solution obtained by numerical methods.
The degenerate equation corresponding to (8) , has the form
As follows from the analysis in section 3, for sufficiently small  it has three roots: 1  , 4  , 
where 0  is defined by expression (14) . Thus, the regular part of asymptotics in the zero approximation is constructed. 
The initial condition for the function
Hence we have 
This asymptotics gives high accuracy of approximation to the solution even with small parameter  values close to one. Fig. 10 shows the comparison of the zeroth approximation (24) and the solution obtained numerically. Fig. 10 . Comparison of the solution obtained by numerical methods, and the zero-order approximation with the following parameters:
Here the solid line is the solution obtained by numerical methods, the dotted line -zero order approximation.
A sociological interpretation of the results
In this section, we consider a sociological interpretation to the mathematical results. Fig. 11 serves to illustrate the case of inequality (6) which is considered in Section 3. For each value of polarization d and the initial condition   0  the outcome of the confrontation is specified: the complete victory of one party or another, or draw. If the polarization is small enough (i.e. h d Q P h     ), then the chances of parties to win are equal, despite the fact that the party X has propaganda of greater intensity, and a draw is also possible. Here and further "chances of winning" are understood in terms of the initial distribution of individuals between the parties, as shown in the figure.
With the growth of polarization within these limits, the chances of each party to win are reduced and the chances for a draw increase. When the polarization exceeds the value Q P h  then party Y loses any chance to win, i.e. either the victory of party X, or draw is possible. At the same time, with further growth of the polarization, the chances of party X to win are reduced. Finally, at d Q P h    only a draw is possible. Fig. 11 . The dependence of confrontation outcome on the initial conditions and the degree of polarization when the condition (6) is fulfilled COMPUTATIONAL MATHEMATICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES № 1 / 2017 78 Condition (6) and connected with it Fig. 11 do not exhaust all possible cases with respect to the problem (3), (4) . Graphs for the other two cases (out of six) are shown in Fig. 12 . At the same time, the situation in Fig. 12 b is, in a sense, degenerative: the party with less intense propaganda cannot win under any initial conditions.
The graphs show that in all cases, at sufficiently high polarization of society the advantage in the propaganda becomes irrelevant, that is, the party with the stronger propaganda cannot win under any initial condition. Another conclusionfor this party, moderate polarization, as a rule is more favorable (and in any case no less favorable) than low polarization а b 
